The Calvo pricing model that lies at the heart of many New Keynesian business cycle models has been roundly criticized for being inconsistent both with time series data on in ‡ation and with micro-data on the frequency of price changes. In this paper I develop a new pricing model whose structure can be interpreted in terms of menu costs and information gathering/processing costs, that usefully recognizes both criticisms. The resulting Phillips curve encompasses the partial-indexation model, the full-indexation model, and the Calvo model, and can speak to micro-data in ways that these models cannot. Taking the Phillips curve to the data, I …nd that the share of …rms that change prices each quarter is about 60 percent and, perhaps re ‡ecting the importance of information gathering/processing costs, that price indexation is important for in ‡ation dynamics.
Introduction
New Keynesian business cycle models have become the dominant framework for studying the design and conduct of monetary policy. The models formalize the rigidities and market imperfections that govern their behavior and are micro-founded, which permits welfare analysis and makes policy experiments conducted within them less susceptible to the Lucas (1976) critique. Prominent examples in the New Keynesian tradition include Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) , McCallum and Nelson (1999) , Walsh (2003) , and Woodford (2003) . One of the most important components in these models is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the equation linking in ‡ation to marginal costs that provides a stabilization role for monetary policy. The "micro-structure"that is most widely used to derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve is the Calvo model 1 (Calvo, 1983) , and the de…ning feature of this model is that only a …xed (Calvo-) share of …rms have the opportunity to optimize their prices each period. This Calvo-share parameter governs the frequency with which …rms change prices and determines the average duration between price changes.
Despite its popularity, the New Keynesian Phillips curve has attracted considerable criticism. Some criticisms are empirical; Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) argue that the New Keynesian Phillips curve provides a poor description of in ‡ation dynamics because it asserts a correlation structure among in ‡ation, the change in in ‡ation, and marginal costs that prevents it from replicating the hump-shaped responses that are widely recognized to characterize in ‡ation's behavior following shocks. Similarly, Rudd and Whelan (2006) argue that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is incapable of describing in ‡ation dynamics and suggest that there is little evidence of the type of forward-looking behavior required by the model. Other criticisms focus on whether estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve are economically plausible. In this vein, a prominent criticism is that Calvo-shares estimated from the New Keynesian Phillips curve imply a level of price rigidity that is inconsistent with micro-data on the frequency of price adjustment. For example, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) estimate the Calvo-share to be around 0:85 for the United States, which implies that only 15 percent of …rms change their prices each quarter and that …rms change prices once every 20 months on average. But after examining Bureau of Labor Statistics data on price changes -the very price data that go into the consumer price index and the personal consumption expenditures price index -Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that, excluding temporary sales, the average duration between price changes for the expenditure-weighted median good is 5:5 months and 8:6 months, respectively. The disparity between estimates of the Calvoshare and micro-evidence on the frequency of price adjustment is worrisome, particularly since models built around the New Keynesian Phillips curve are routinely used to address issues as important as how to design a welfare-maximizing monetary policy.
In this paper, I develop a new model of price setting, building on Calvo (1983) . An essential feature of this model is that, although a share of …rms have the opportunity to change prices each period, they do not necessarily make an optimal price change. Instead, among those …rms that change prices a fraction makes an optimal price change, while the remainder employ an indexation pricing strategy. In this model, …rms, each period, …nd themselves randomly distributed among the three pricing states: a …rm can keep their price unchanged; a …rm can index their price; or a …rm can set its price optimally. Importantly, all three pricing states are internalized by price-setting …rms.
Why is this price-setting environment attractive? Where traditional models of price adjustment have emphasized physical costs to changing prices, such as menu costs, as the source of price rigidity (Mankiw, 1985) , recent literature has emphasized the costs that …rms face when gathering (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) and processing (Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2008 ) the information they require in order to set prices optimally. In fact, some evidence suggests that costs to gathering and processing information and company managerial and organizational issues (Zbaraki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta, and Bergin, 2004; Zbaraki, Levy, and Bergin, 2007) may be much more important for price setting than traditional menu cost factors. An attractive aspect of the price-setting environment developed in this paper is that it provides a vehicle through which both costs can play a role. Menu costs -which are incurred whether or not a price change is optimal -are associated with the share of …rms that can change prices. When these menu costs are large, a smaller share of …rms is likely to change their prices. Similarly, costs to gathering and processing information are associated with the share of price changers that use price indexation. When the costs to gathering and processing information are high, a larger share of price-changing …rms might resort to an indexation-based pricing strategy.
After describing the model, I derive its associated Phillips curve, highlighting its connections to the New Keynesian Phillips curve and to the full-and partial-indexation Phillips curves. Speci…cally, I show that these alternatives are all special cases of the Phillips curve I derive. Subsequently, I develop a small-scale New Keynesian business cycle model and estimate speci…cations based on the Phillips curve I derive, the Calvo Phillips curve, the fullindexation Phillips curve, and the Galí-Gertler Phillips curve . The results are striking. First, whereas estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve imply an average duration between price changes that is clearly inconsistent with Bureau of Labor Statistics price data, the model I develop does much better. In fact, my results place the share of …rms that change prices each quarter at about 60 percent, suggesting relatively frequent price adjustment. Second, although …rms change prices frequently, I …nd that the data want the majority of these …rms use price indexation, consistent with the view that factors such as information gathering/processing costs may be extremely important for price setting. This paper is related to the interesting study by Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (2008), who develop a Phillips curve that integrates sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002 ) with sticky prices (Calvo, 1983 ). Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (2008) assume that the …xed share of …rms that can update their prices each period is independent of the …xed share of …rms can update their information set to derive a Phillips curve that contains a role for both menu costs and information-gathering costs. They show that their speci…cation is related closely to a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve, but with an additional term to allow for the distribution of information across "inattentive" …rms. Despite its similar motivation, their estimation suggests that only 14 percent of …rms change their prices each quarter, but that 42 percent of …rms update their information sets. Empirically, therefore, their speci…cation, much like the Calvo Phillips curve, implies relatively infrequent price adjustment and suggests that menu costs may be more important for …rms pricing than information-gathering costs.
I begin by describing the New Keynesian Phillips curve and illustrating the empirical disparity between the Calvo-share and the frequency of price adjustment implied by microdata. Section 3 outlines the economic environment that underlies my model and derives the associated Phillips curve. Section 4 compares the model to the Calvo model, the fullindexation model, and the partial-indexation model and proves its isomorphism with the partial-indexation model. Section 5 develops a small-scale New Keynesian business cycle model suitable for estimation, describes the data, and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 6 presents and interprets the estimates and compares them to those obtained from alternative pricing models. Section 7 concludes.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve and price rigidity
As noted in the introduction, the centerpiece to much business cycle and policy analysis is the New Keynesian Phillips curve
where b t and c mc t represent the percentage point deviation of in ‡ation, t , and the percent deviation of real marginal costs, mc t , around their zero-in ‡ation nonstochastic steady state values, respectively. An economic environment that gives rise to this Phillips curve is one in which …rms are monopolistically competitive, renting capital and labor and setting their prices to maximize pro…ts subject to a constant elasticity of substitution demand curve, a
Cobb-Douglas production technology, and a price rigidity, á la Calvo (1983) . 2 In equation
(1), 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor and 2 (0; 1) is the Calvo-share, the share of …rms that cannot optimize their prices each period. Among studies that estimate , a popular approach is to apply a generalized method of moments estimator to the moment condition 3
where z t is a vector containing econometric instruments. This is the approach taken by Galí Ravenna and Walsh (2006) . An alternative method is to iterate forward over equation (1) and combine the result with an evolution process for real marginal costs to produce an estimable expression relating in ‡ation to real marginal costs (Sbordone, 2 Gertler and Leahy (2008) provide an alternative derivation that is based on state-contingent pricing. 3 An alternative moment condition that is often used is equation (2) 
Strategic complementarity and …rm-speci…c capital
One way to resolve the apparent inconsistency between macro-and micro-estimates of the frequency of price adjustment is to change the pricing environment to allow for factors such as strategic complementarity (Woodford, 2003) and/or …rm-speci…c capital (Sbordone, 2002) .
These changes add one or more structural parameters to the coe¢ cient on real marginal costs, thereby permitting greater ‡exibility with respect to the choice of . Unfortunately, because these modi…cations leave the Phillips curve's structure unchanged, they cannot, in isolation, overcome the criticism that the New Keynesian Phillips curve provides a poor description of in ‡ation dynamics (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002; Rudd and Whelan, 2006) . 4 All of the estimates reported in Table 1 have been made consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production technology and rental markets for capital and labor, facilitating comparison across studies by making the estimates invariant to particular assumptions about the steady state markup and labor's share of income. However, the values shown may di¤er from those reported in the original papers as a consequence. With respect to Sbordone's estimates, the best-…tting speci…cation in Sbordone (2002 , Table 2 ) has a coe¢ cient on real marginal costs equaling . Using Sbordone's assumption about the discount factor and assuming a rental market for capital, the implied value for is 0:792. 5 Of course, there are other notable studies that look at micro-data on the frequency of price adjustment, including Cecchetti (1986) , Carlton (1986) , and Kashyap (1995) .
A new pricing model
Firms are assumed to be monopolistically competitive and to produce according to a constantreturns-to-scale production technology subject to a downward-sloping demand schedule. In the spirit of Calvo (1983) , not all …rms can change their prices each period, and, in the spirit of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), not all price changes that do occur are chosen optimally. However, unlike Calvo (1983) , in which …rms either set their prices optimally or keep their prices unchanged, and unlike Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), in which …rms either set their prices optimally or index their prices to past in ‡ation, in the model developed here …rms are randomly allocated among three pricing states. Depending on draws from two independent Bernoulli distributions, a …rm either sets its price optimally, sets its price using an indexation rule, or keeps its price unchanged. Informally, the parameters that govern the share of …rms allocated to each pricing state can be interpreted in terms of menu costs and the costs associated with gathering and processing the information needed to set prices optimally. To identify this model in subsequent discussion, I refer to it as the generalized-Calvo model.
The model developed below is also related to one developed by Galí and Gertler (1999) ; the two models share the three distinct pricing strategies outlined above. However, there are several important di¤erences between the two models. One important di¤erence is that 
Basic structure
The economy is populated by a unit-measure continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms.
The i'th …rm, i 2 [0; 1], produces its di¤erentiated product according to the Cobb-Douglas production technology
2 (0; 1), where e ut is an aggregate labor-augmenting technology shock and y t (i), l t (i), and k t (i) denote the i'th …rm's output, labor, and capital, respectively. Firms rent capital and hire labor in perfectly competitive markets and, because they face identical factor prices, employ capital and labor in the same ratio and share the same real marginal cost, i.e., mc t (i) = mc t ,
A …nal good, Y t , is produced from the outputs of the monopolistically competitive …rms according to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) constant-returns-to-scale production technology
where 2 (1; 1) is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Final goods are used for consumption and investment and are sold to households in a perfectly competitive market. E¢ cient production of the …nal good implies that the demand schedule for the i'th …rm's output takes the form
where P t (i) is the price charged by the i'th …rm and P t is the aggregate price index, the price of the …nal good.
Each period a …xed proportion of …rms, 1 , 2 [0; 1), are able to change prices.
However, not all …rms that change prices do so optimally. Within the share of …rms that change prices, a …xed proportion, 1 !, ! 2 [0; 1), change their prices optimally, while the remaining proportion, !, set their prices using the indexation rule
where t denotes the in ‡ation rate of the …nal good. Unlike the Calvo model, in which …rms either set their prices optimally or keep their prices unchanged, here …rms are distributed among three pricing states. Speci…cally, each period a measure equaling of …rms do not change their prices, a measure equaling ! (1 ) of …rms change their prices using the indexation rule, and a measure equaling (1 !) (1 ) of …rms set their prices to maximize expected discounted pro…ts, with …rms falling randomly into one of these three pricing states independently of their history of price changes.
To interpret this pricing structure, note that and ! can each be associated informally with a distinct cost impinging on the …rm's pricing decision. The …rst set of costs, menu costs, are borne by …rms when they change prices, regardless of whether the price change is optimal or not; these costs are associated with . The second set of costs are those connected to the information gathering (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) and information processing (Sims, 2003) needed to determine the optimal price; these costs are associated with !. Importantly, , which represents a cost to changing prices, determines the share of …rms that change prices, as estimates of , the proportion of …rms that change prices, rather than as estimates of
, the proportion of …rms that change prices optimally.
The Phillips curve derived below is obtained by approximating the model around a zeroin ‡ation steady state. In Appendix B, I treat the more general case in which the approximation is taken around a non-zero-in ‡ation steady state and show that plausible values for steady state in ‡ation do not have a large e¤ect on the Phillips curve's coe¢ cients.
The Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price
With the indexation rule given by equation (6), I show in Appendix A that the aggregate price, the price of the …nal good, equals
where P t is the price chosen by …rms that can set their price optimally. 6 Log-linearizing equation (7) around a zero-in ‡ation steady state, the quasi-di¤erence in aggregate in ‡ation is related to the optimal relative price according to
where b p t denotes the percent deviation in p t from p = 1. Conditional on b p t , equation (8) implies that the correlation between in ‡ation and its lag is an increasing function of ! and a decreasing function of . Further, conditional on lagged in ‡ation, equation (8) implies that the correlation between t and b p t is a decreasing function of and !.
The pricing decision
I assume that ! + > 0, ruling out the case where all prices are ‡exible, but not ruling out the case where all …rms change prices ( = 0) or the case where all price-changing …rms optimize (! = 0). With this assumption, in period t + 1 a …rm that cannot optimize its price between period t and period t + 1 will expect to charge the price
where the two terms in equation (9) correspond to the two non-optimizing pricing states, with each state weighted by its conditional probability. Iterating forward over equation (9), a …rm that cannot optimally set its price will expect in period t + j to charge the price
Turning to the decision problem facing …rms that can choose their price, in light of equation (10) these …rms will choose P t (i) to maximize
where + ! (1 ) denotes the share of …rms that cannot optimize their prices and t is a shadow price representing the marginal utility of consumption in period t.
Di¤erentiating equation (11) with respect to P t (i), the resulting …rst-order condition is
which, when log-linearized around a zero-in ‡ation steady state, yields
Equation (13) establishes that, in addition to real marginal costs and its expected future price, the …rm's pricing decision is shaped by current and expected future in ‡ation. Because is increasing in both and !, it is clear from equation (13) that increases in and ! raise the importance of future prices and lower the importance of current real marginal costs for the price chosen today.
The Phillips curve
To derive the Phillips curve, I combine equations (8) and (13) to obtain the expression
Equation (14) has the form of a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. Notice that the pricing parameters, and !, a¤ect both the lead-lag structure of in ‡ation and the coe¢ cient on real marginal costs. Speci…cally, it is not di¢ cult to see that an increase in ! raises the coe¢ cient on lagged in ‡ation and lowers the coe¢ cients on future in ‡ation and real marginal costs. Similarly, an increase in raises the coe¢ cient on future in ‡ation and lowers the coe¢ cients on lagged in ‡ation and real marginal costs. Importantly, then, in ‡ation dynamics are informative of the extent and nature of the price rigidity and, moreover, a decline in the coe¢ cient on real marginal costs need not imply higher menu costs (and greater price rigidity);
it may, instead, imply higher information gathering/processing costs.
Some interesting special cases
It is interesting to relate the Phillips curve derived above to other speci…cations in the literature. If I set ! = 0, eliminating the pricing state in which …rms index, then equation (14) collapses to
which is equivalent to the purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve associated with the Calvo (1983) model, equation (1) . Similarly, if I set = 0, eliminating the pricing state in which …rms do not change prices, then equation (14) simpli…es to
which is equivalent to the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) full-indexation Phillips curve.
Because equation (14) Proposition 1 To a …rst-order (log-) approximation about a zero-in ‡ation steady state, the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve, equation (14), and the partial-indexation Phillips curve, equation (17), are isomorphic.
Proof. De…ne
+!(1 ) and = + ! (1 ), then the partial-indexation Phillips curve can be written as
After some simple cancellations, equation (18) becomes
which has the same structure as the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve. Now, by inspection, for all ! 2 [0; 1) and 2 [0; 1) that satisfy ! + > 0, then 2 [0; 1] and 2 (0; 1), which establishes that the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve is a special case of the partial-indexation Phillips curve. Conversely, de…ne (1 ) and ! 1 (1 ) , which imply = , then the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve can be written as
which in turn simpli…es to
Equation ( 
System estimation
To estimate the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve I embed it within a small-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and estimate the resulting system using likelihood methods. The DSGE model is standard so I present the key equations, leaving the derivations to appendices. With c t denoting consumption, R t denoting the short-term nominal interest rate, and g t denoting an aggregate consumption preference shock, the log-linearized consumption Euler equation is given by (see Appendix C)
where 2 (0; 1) is the (external) habit parameter, 2 (0; 1) is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and = ln ( ) is the discount rate. Combining the production technology, the resource constraint, and the household labor supply decision, real marginal costs are given by (see Appendix D)
where 2 (0; 1) is the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
With respect to the nominal interest rate, I assume that R t is set according to
which is a standard forward-looking Taylor-type rule, essentially the same as the speci…cation studied by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998 Gertler ( , 2000 . Equation (22) postulates that the central bank responds with inertia to future expected in ‡ation and, through consumption, to the state of the business cycle. Expected future in ‡ation rather than current or lagged in ‡ation enters the rule to capture the fact that central banks consider the economy's future evolution when conducting monetary policy.
Bayesian estimation
With the parameters of model represented by , p ( ) is the prior density for , p fz 1t g T 2 j is the conditional data density, and p j fz 1t g T 2 is the posterior density of the parameter density conditional on the data and the model. As always with Bayesian estimation, interest centers on the posterior density, which from Bayes's theorem, is given by
To draw from the posterior density, I use the random walk chain Metropolios-Hastings algorithm. Ten overdispersed chains of length 60; 000 were constructed, from which the …rst 10; 000 "burn-in"draws were discarded, leaving a total of 500; 000 usable draws. Convergence of the chains was determined using diagnostics developed by Gelman (1995) and Geweke (1992).
To calculate the marginal data density, or marginal likelihood,
which is the probability of observing the data given the model, I use Geweke's (1999) modi…ca-tion of the Gelfand and Dey (1994) method. As equation (24) shows, the marginal likelihood is evaluated by averaging the conditional data density with respect to the prior density.
Data
To Reserve chairmen. I use the quarterly average of the federal funds rate to measure R t , use 100 ln C t =C T t to measure the consumption gap, where C t is real consumption and C T t is trend consumption, 7 and use 400 ln (P t =P t 1 ), where P t is the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, to measure in ‡ation.
Priors
Aside from the parameters describing the shock processes, the key model parameters are = f ; ; ; ; ; ; !; ; ; c ; r g. The priors for these behavioral parameters are summarized in Table 2a . Brie ‡y, the priors for and have means equaling 2:50 and 3:00 percent, respectively, at annual rates. The priors for and r are each Beta distributions with means equaling 0:75.
The prior for the in ‡ation indexation parameter, !, is a uniform distribution over the unit interval while that for the frequency of price adjustment, , re ‡ecting the results in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), has a Beta distribution that is centered on 0:66. The prior for the 7 Trend consumption was constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with = 1; 600.
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , has a Gamma distribution with a mean equaling 2:00 and, to re ‡ect the wide range of estimates in the literature, a relatively large standard deviation of 2:00. Based on Smets and Wouters (2007) , the prior for the labor-supply elasticity, , has a Normal distribution with a mean equaling 2:00 and a standard deviation of 0:75.
The prior for the shock process is implemented as follows. First, the solution to the rational expectations model is written in the form
where " t = Gv t are reduced-form shocks. The priors for the elements in =E Table 2b . Table 3 presents the estimates of the DSGE model parameters. The table displays the posterior mean, median, and mode, and a 90 percent probability interval for the Bayesian estimation. Also shown is the (log-) marginal likelihood (log-ML). The Bayesian estimates of the rate of time preference, , are about 2:6. This estimate is consistent with those of the equilibrium real interest rate (Laubach and Williams, 2003) and place the quarterly discount factor at just over 0:99, in line with values widely used in calibration exercises. Looking at the utility function parameters, the habit formation parameter, , is estimated to be about 0:89, implying that habit formation is important and that there is considerable inertia in consumption. Elsewhere, estimates of vary widely.
DSGE model estimates
Smets and Wouters (2005) With respect to pricing behavior, the two key parameters are and !. The Bayesian estimation has the distribution for centered on about 0:40, with a 90 percent probability interval covering 0:26 to 0:54. These estimates place the frequency of price adjustment somewhere around 0:60, suggesting relatively frequent price adjustment and that menu costs are perhaps not a huge impediment to a …rm changing its price. At the same time, the estimate of ! is large, implying that most …rms that change prices do so using indexation. Together, the estimates of and ! are consistent with the view that information gathering/processing costs are more important for pricing behavior than menu costs.
Partial-indexation Phillips curve estimates
Proposition 1 shows how estimates of the partial-indexation Phillips curve can be used to shed light on the values of and ! in the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve; a range of estimates for the U.S are reported in Table 4 . 8 Table 4 The key result that emerges from Table 4 is that estimates of and ! inferred from estimates of the partial-indexation Phillips curve are relatively consistent with those for the generalized-Calvo model shown in Table 3 , even though they are obtained from DSGE models that are quite di¤erent from the one I estimate. Speci…cally, the estimates of in Table 4 are spanned by the interval 0:22 -0:63, and generally re ‡ect quite rapid price adjustment. Similarly, other than those obtained by Smets and Wouters (2007) and Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), the estimates of ! in Table 4 indicate that the share of …rms that index prices is large.
Alternative pricing speci…cations
In this section I estimate three additional Phillips curve speci…cations and consider the results in light of the generalized-Calvo model estimated above. With the remainder of the model continuing to be given by equations (20)- (22), I estimate the New Keynesian Phillips curve, equation (15), the full-indexation Phillips curve, equation (16), and a hybrid Phillips curve developed by Galí and Gertler (1999) , which is given by
Although and ! carry the same interpretation in the Galí and Gertler (1999) model as they do in the generalized-Calvo model, the …rm's optimization problem is quite di¤erent. Thus, while similar in the variables it depends upon, equation (26) is otherwise quite dissimilar to the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve, equation (14) . Table 5 presents median estimates of the parameters in the three alternative pricing speci…cations discussed above. 9 As noted previously, these alternative pricing speci…cations are estimated jointly with equations (20)- (22). Setting the estimates of and ! aside for the moment, the estimates of the remaining structural parameters are all reasonably consistent across the three speci…cations and consistent with those reported in Table 3 . With respect to the two pricing parameters, estimates from the Calvo model, the full-indexation model, and the Galí-Gertler model all suggest that the share of …rms that set their price optimally each quarter is small. However, where the Calvo model suggests that the majority of …rms keeps their prices unchanged, the fullindexation model suggests that the same majority index their prices to lagged in ‡ation. The Galí-Gertler model suggests that while the majority of …rms keeps their prices unchanged each period, about 63 percent of those that do change their prices do so by rule of thumb.
Clearly, although the Galí-Gertler model and the generalized-Calvo model both highlight the importance of rule-of-thumb pricing or price indexation for in ‡ation dynamics, they tell very di¤erent stories regarding the frequency of price adjustment. Speci…cally, the Galí-Gertler model indicates that more than 90 percent of …rms keep their price unchanged each quarter whereas the generalized-Calvo model places this share at closer to 40 percent.
Conclusion
The Calvo-based New Keynesian Phillips curve has been widely criticized for being economi- 
A Appendix: Aggregate prices
From the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, the price level is de…ned according to
Recognizing that at any point in time …rms either set their price optimally, use price indexation, or keep their price unchanged, equation (A1) is equivalent to
(A2) Because the …rms that do not change their prices and that use indexation are chosen randomly, equation (A2) is equivalent to
which is equation (7) in the text. If I assume, say, that there exists an initial period in which there is no relative price dispersion, then it is straightforward to see that equation (A4) holds for all t 1. Alternatively, by accounting for how …rms that either did not change prices today or that used price indexation today have set prices in the past, and exploiting, …rst, that a …rm's pricing strategy is determined randomly, and, second, that as the initial period tends to 1 the share of …rms setting prices today that have never set their prices optimally converges to zero (or that there exists an initial period in which there is no relative price dispersion, making the summation in equation (A5) …nite), equation (A2) can be written as
and combining equations (A5) and (A6) yields
which, again, is equation (7) in the text.
B Appendix: The non-zero-in ‡ation steady state case representing the optimal relative price, it follows from equation (A4) (equation (7) in the text) that in a non-zero-in ‡ation steady state, the steady state optimal relative price, p , is given by
(1 !) (1 )
In order for the steady state optimal relative price to be positive (p > 0), it must be the case that
which, for 2 (0; 1), leads to
Equation (B1) implies that p is increasing in for 2 ( 1; e 1 ], and greater than one for 2 (0; e 1 ], less than one for 2 ( 1; 0), and equal to one for = 0. Notably, because prices are not fully ‡exible, on occasions when they can change prices, …rms respond to a positive steady state in ‡ation rate by raising prices by more than they otherwise would have, with in ‡ation then eroding these high relative prices over time. Of course, the extent to which a positive steady state in ‡ation rate lifts the steady state optimal relative price is mitigated by greater substitutability between goods and by greater price ‡exibility. Now, looking at equation (B2), it is straightforward to see that e 1 is decreasing in ", which is intuitive because greater substitutability between goods is incompatible with sticky prices unless steady state in ‡ation is low. Similarly, for a given elasticity of substitution between goods, greater price rigidity requires a lower steady state in ‡ation rate if the optimal relative price is to remain well-de…ned.
Log-linearizing equation (A4) around a non-zero-in ‡ation steady state, the quasi-di¤erence in aggregate in ‡ation is related to the optimal relative price according to
where b p t denotes the percent deviation in p t from p . Equation (B3) is the analogue of equation (8) in the text.
From equation (11) , the pricing decision for …rms that can set their price optimally leads to the …rst-order condition
which, provided (1 + ) < 1, implies that the steady state relationship between real marginal costs and the optimal relative price is
Equation (B5) reveals the steady state markup over real marginal costs as a function of the model's parameters. In a zero-in ‡ation steady state, the markup depends only on the elasticity of substitution between goods and is given by 1 " 1 . More generally, equation (B5) shows that in a non-zero-in ‡ation steady state the markup depends on , , !, and , in addition to ". Although the steady state markup continues to be an increasing function of ", it is also an increasing function of the steady state in ‡ation rate.
The restriction that the parameters satisfy (1 + ) < 1, which is needed to ensure that the model has a well-de…ned steady state, gives rise to the condition
indicating that e 2 is declining in the discount factor, , and in the share of non-optimizing …rms, . Combining equations (B2) and (B6), e is given by e = minfe 1 ; e 2 g:
Log-linearizing equation (B4) around a non-zero-in ‡ation steady state and assuming symmetry yields
which is the analogue of equation (13) in the text. The Phillips curve associated with this pricing structure can be obtained by combining equations (B3) and (B7) in the usual way. Although the coe¢ cients in the resulting expression are complicated functions of the model parameters, in terms of its general structure, the generalized-Calvo Phillips curve is given by t = f ( ; !; "; ; ) E t ( t+1 ) + b ( ; !; "; ; ) ( t 1 ) + s ( ; !; "; ; ) c mc t ;
containing both forward-and backward-looking in ‡ation dynamics and having real marginal costs as the driving variable. The relationship between the Phillips curve coe¢ cients, f , b, and s, and the model parameters is complicated but straightforward to analyze numerically. To this end, with …xed at 0:99, the four panels in Figure 2 illustrate how f , b, and s vary in response to changes in , !, ", and . For this exercise, I set = 0:50, ! = 0:50, " = 11, and = 0:005 and consider independent variations in each parameter holding the remaining parameters unchanged.
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis Figure 2 reveals two important results. First, the model coe¢ cients are sensitive to variation in and !, which implies that the Phillips curve is informative for these two pricing parameters. Second, the model coe¢ cients are not especially sensitive to variation in " and , which implies that estimates of and ! are likely to be robust to di¤erent assumptions regarding " and .
C Appendix: The household problem
Households choose consumption, c t , investment, i t , their supply of labor, l t , and their holdings of nominal money balances, m t , and bonds, b t , to maximize where R t denotes the nominal interest rate, w t denotes the consumption real wage, r t denotes the real rental payment on capital, t denotes the lump-sum pro…ts households earn from dividend payments from …rms and the seigniorage revenues households receive from the government, and k t denotes the capital stock owned by the household. Equation (C1) allows for habit formation, positing that what matters for households is their consumption in relation to lagged aggregate consumption, C t 1 . Since household consumption must always remain above the habit stock (c t C t 1 ) > 0, additive habits are closely related to the notion that there is a subsistence level below which a household's consumption cannot fall. The …rst-order conditions for the Lagrangian, , associated with the household's problem, include 
Equation (C2) simply de…nes t , the shadow price of capital, to equal the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (C3) implies that households supply labor up to the point where the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the consumption real wage, w t . Equation (C4) shows that the bond market clears at an aggregate stock of zero when the expected change in the shadow price of capital equals the ex ante real interest rate. Finally, equations (C5) and (C4) imply that in equilibrium households are indi¤erent between owning bonds and capital. Combining equations (C2) and (C4), the log-linear consumption Euler equation is
which is equivalent to equation (20) in the text.
D Appendix: Aggregate real marginal costs
Cost minimization implies that …rms rent capital and labor such that
implying that a …rms'real marginal costs depend on the ratio of the consumption real wage to its marginal productivity of labor, i.e., mc t (i) = 1 w t l t (i) y t (i) :
Of course, since all …rms face the same rental prices for capital and labor and are subject to the same aggregate technology shock, they employ capital and labor in the same ratio and share the same real marginal costs. Therefore, mc t (i) = 1 w t l t y t :
Log-linearizing equation (D1) implies
Equation (D2) establishes that, to a …rst-order log-linear approximation, aggregate real marginal costs depend on the consumption real wage and the aggregate marginal productivity of labor.
The …rm-level production function is given by,
which, when log-linearized yields
To proceed further, I consider the limiting case in which " 1 and the role of capital in production tends to zero. Under this assumption the log-linearized resource constraint is b c t = b y t . Combining equations (D2) and (D3) with (a log-linearized) equation (C3), the expression for real marginal costs becomes c mc t = b y t (1 + ) u t b t :
Now log-linearizing equation (C2) yields
implying that real marginal costs equal
which is equation (21) in the text.
